Modeling household behavior in a CGE model: linear expenditure system or indirect addilog? by Boer, P.M.C. (Paul) de
 1
Modeling household behavior in a CGE model:  
linear expenditure system or indirect addilog? 
 
Paul de Boer* 
 
Econometric Institute, Erasmus University Rotterdam 
 
ECONOMETRIC INSTITUTE REPORT EI 2009-16 
 
Abstract 
 
We try to argue that in a computable general equilibrium model, household preferences should be 
modeled by the indirect addilog system (IAS) rather than by the frequently used linear expenditure 
system (LES). Both systems have the same data requirement and are as easy to implement, but 
IAS provides for a richer description of preferences. Contrarily to LES, its Engel curves are non-
linear and it allows for inferior commodities, elastic demand and gross substitution. LES assigns 
zero utility to households with expenditure below a positive minimum value, whereas IAS assigns a 
positive utility, provided zero expenditure is replaced by a small positive number. In micro 
simulation models where the results of a macro CGE model (with one representative household) 
are used at micro level, this constitutes a clear advantage of IAS. In the framework of an 
expenditure survey, we find overwhelming statistical evidence that the IAS indirect utility function is 
likely to be (much) closer to the true indirect utility function than LES. Consequently, expenditure 
elasticities and welfare changes are likely to be (much) better estimated by IAS. Simulations with a 
CGE model for Palestine show that price responses and equivalent variation are considerably 
higher for IAS than for LES.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In applied economic research, computable general equilibrium (CGE) models are widely used. In 
these models, the behavior of several economic actors (e.g. firms, household, government, and 
rest of the world) is modeled in blocks; the links between these blocks are modeled, as well. In this 
paper we focus on one of these blocks, the model of household behavior.   
The CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, for instance, uses a recursively 
dynamic CGE model for the world economy, named WorldScan (Lejour et al., 2006; Don and 
Verbruggen, 2006).The model is used both as a tool to construct long-term scenarios and as an 
instrument for policy assessments. In WorldScan the household is modeled by means of the Linear 
Expenditure System (LES).  
Besides WorldScan, other well-known CGE models use LES specifications, as well. MIRAGE, the 
CGE model of CEPII (Centre d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales) uses a 
combination of the constant elasticities of substitution (CES) functional form (Arrow et al., 1961) 
combined with LES (Bchir et al., 2002, p. 47). Linkage, a CGE model of the World Bank, uses as 
default the LES augmented with savings (Van der Mensbrugghe, 2005, p. 21).  GTAP, the Global 
Trade Analysis Project of the Purdue University, (Cranfield et al., 2000; Reimer and Hertel, 2004) 
allows, besides LES, for a generalization, the so-called AIDADS (An Implicitly Directly Additive 
Demand System due to Rimmer and Powell,1996). Van der Mensbrugghe (2005) discusses this 
model in his appendix G. AIDADS allows for a richer description of Engel curves (the relationship 
between expenditure on a certain commodity and total expenditure) than LES, but ‘comes at the 
expense of an additional (n −1) parameters’ (Rimmer and Powell, 1996, p. 1615). In many practical 
applications, this prevents AIDADS from being used. 
The disadvantage of LES is that the Engel curves are straight lines. Moreover, LES does not allow 
for the existence of inferior commodities (expenditure elasticities smaller than zero), elastic 
demand (absolute value of the own price elasticity larger than one) and gross substitution (positive 
cross price elasticity); see Chung (1994, chap. 2). An alternative for modeling household behavior 
is the indirect addilog system (IAS), which is as simple to implement as LES, but which exhibits 
non-linear Engel curves and allows for the existence of inferior commodities, elastic demand and 
gross substitution. Consequently, IAS provides a theoretically richer description of household 
behavior than LES, while it is also easy to implement. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether in a CGE model household behavior should be 
modeled according to LES or to IAS. As an example we take the CGE model constructed by 
Missaglia and de Boer (2004) for the analysis of emergency assistance to the Palestinian 
economy. Following common practice, we used LES, augmented for leisure (De Melo and Tarr, 
1992; Blonigen et al., 1997), for modeling the consumption block, and assigned values to the 
expenditure elasticities, to the Frisch parameter and the elasticity of labor supply in order to 
calibrate its parameters. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. In section II we summarize the well-known properties of 
LES, give the theoretical properties of IAS and pay attention to the calibration of the parameters of 
both systems in the framework of a CGE model. Section III deals with the estimation of parameters 
of LES and IAS on expenditure survey data, with the likelihood ratio test for non-nested 
hypotheses of Vuong (1989), and with the distribution-free test due to Clarke (2007) for a formal 
statistical comparison of LES and IAS (De Boer and Paap, 2009). Sections IV and V are devoted to 
our empirical application. On the one hand, we dispose of the 1998 Social Accounting Matrix 
(SAM) constructed by the World Bank, used by Missaglia and de Boer (2004). On the other hand, 
we dispose of the Palestinian Expenditure and Consumption Survey (PECS, 1998) conducted by 
the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). Both datasets are only available at a rather 
high level of aggregation. The only level at which both datasets are compatible is the three- 
commodity-level adopted in this paper: Agrifood (agriculture and food processing industry); 
Manufacturing; and Services. In section IV we estimate the parameters of LES and IAS on the data 
of PECS (1998) and test LES versus IAS. It turns out that there is overwhelming evidence for the 
IAS specification over the LES specification. As a first consequence, the equivalent and/or 
compensating variation (Varian, 1992, p. 161), used in practice for the evaluation of policy 
changes, is likely to be (much) better estimated by IAS than by LES. As a second consequence, 
the estimated expenditure elasticities are likely to be (much) closer to the “true” expenditure 
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elasticities than those estimated for by LES. We present the implied expenditure elasticities 
according to IAS and use them in the sequel. It turns out that Agrifood is a necessary commodity 
(expenditure elasticity smaller than one) and that Manufacturing and Services are luxury 
commodities (expenditure elasticities larger than one). We calibrate the parameters of both 
systems by fixing the so-called Frisch parameter at -1.20, corresponding to a subsistence 
expenditure of 16.7% of total expenditure in the framework of LES. This value has been used in 
the model of Missaglia and de Boer (2004) which showed a very good ex-post evaluation of macro-
economic indicators for the Palestinian economy in 2002 (De Boer, 2009). The calibrated values of 
the minimum quantities demanded for the LES specification turn out to be such that 80.6% of the 
households that participated in the expenditure survey (PECS, 1998) are assigned a utility level of 
zero, whereas each household has a positive utility level according to the IAS specification. 
Consequently, in a micro simulation model where the results of a macro CGE model are used at 
micro level, the IAS specification has a clear advantage over LES. It turns out that the price 
elasticities of both specifications are close to each other and that the own price elasticity of 
Agrifood is about -0.80. Next, we calibrate the parameters of both systems by means of fixing this 
own price elasticity first at -0.72 (10% above -0.80) and second at -0.88 (10% below -0.80). In the 
first case, the Frisch parameter according to IAS, decreases by about 10% to -1.31, whereas it 
decreases by about 20% to -1.46 for LES, corresponding to a subsistence expenditure of about 
30% of total expenditure, which does not seem to be unrealistic. The percentage of households to 
which LES assigns a utility level of zero, however, increases to 93.8, which is a quite unrealistic 
result. In the second case the minimum quantities demanded of Manufacturing and of Services 
become negative so that LES cannot handle an own price elasticity of Agrifood of -0.88. However, 
IAS can handle this value. It turns out that Manufacturing and Services are price elastic (absolute 
value of the own price elasticity larger than one) and that they are gross substitutes for Agrifood 
(cross price elasticities positive).  
In section V we show a concrete Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) application of the addilog 
demand system. The application is related to previous work on the Palestinian economy (Missaglia 
and de Boer, 2004; De Boer and Missaglia, 2006, De Boer, 2009) and refers to the building of a 
counterfactual Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for the Palestinian economy in 2002. The last 
available official SAM for the Palestinian economy dates back to 1998 and the need to build a new, 
counterfactual SAM comes from the tremendous shock suffered by the Palestinian economy after 
the outbreak (29 September 2000) of the second intifada (“uprising”), which is likely to have 
dramatically changed its size and composition. A short description of both the CGE model and the 
intifada-shock is given. First, we use the calibrated values of LES and IAS derived on basis of the 
value of -1.20 of the Frisch parameter. As expected, LES being a linear approximation of IAS 
around the equilibrium point, the real part of the CGE model does not exhibit much differences 
between both specifications. The price responses are stronger in the IAS version of the model: the 
Laspeyres consumer price index (CPI) turns out to be 114.0 for IAS and 112.4 for LES. The real 
equivalent variation (in absolute terms) is 10% higher for IAS than for LES (in nominal terms 11.6% 
higher). Consequently, in a LES framework the welfare losses are likely to be grossly 
underestimated since there was overwhelming evidence that the indirect utility function of IAS is 
(much) closer to the true indirect utility function than the one by LES. Second, we use the 
calibrated values derived on the basis of the own price elasticity of Agrifood of -0.72. The CPI turns 
out to be 114.6 for IAS and 112.7 for LES, a difference of almost 2 percentage points. The real 
equivalent compensation is now 11.8% higher for IAS (the nominal one 12.8% higher).  
Section VI, finally, concludes. Since in the CGE model under consideration we take account of the 
demand of leisure in order to model the labor market, we devote appendix B to a treatment of the 
extended indirect addilog system that introduces leisure into the indirect utility function. Moreover 
we show how to calculate the equivalent and compensating variation. Appendix A is devoted to the 
derivation of one of the equations. 
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II. THEORY 
 
Linear expenditure system (LES) 
 
In production and consumer theory the mostly used production function and utility function is 
presumably the one due to Cobb and Douglas (1928). A major shortcoming of the Cobb-Douglas 
utility function is that preferences are homothetic implying unitary expenditure elasticities so that 
Engel curves are straight lines through the origin. Moreover, the expenditure shares are constant. 
Tinbergen (1942) proposed to generalize the Cobb-Douglas production function by introducing 
positive minimum amounts of capital and labor. Shortly after the war this idea was introduced in the 
theory of consumption in a series of articles: Klein and Rubin (1948-1949), Samuelson (1948), 
Geary (1949-1950) and Stone (1954). The function is known as the Stone-Geary utility function 
and reads:  
 


n
1i
ii
ix)x(U        iix                                                                                                     (1)                    
         = 0                            iix   
 
where:   ix                 : demand for commodity i )2n,...,1(  , 
              U                 : utility associated with the consumption bundle  n1 x,...,x'x  ,  
              1α0 i     : marginal expenditure share, with 


n
1i
i 1,  and  
              0i          : minimum quantity demanded from commodity i. 
 
Maximization of (1) subject to the expenditure restriction: 



n
1i
ii mxp                                                                                                                                      (2)                   
where:   ip           : price of commodity i, and 
              m           : total expenditure (income minus savings).       
 
leads to the Linear Expenditure System (LES) (see a.o. Chung, 1994):  
 
)μpm(αμpxp jj jiiiii                                                                                                             (3)                   
Since i  is interpreted to be the minimum quantity demanded of commodity i, jj jμp  represents 
the subsistence expenditure of the household and, as a consequence,  j jjμpm( ) is its 
supernumerary or discretionary expenditure. According to LES the household allocates its 
supernumerary expenditure in fixed fractions over the commodities. Consequently, the Engel 
curve, the relationship between expenditure on commodity i and total expenditure, is a straight line, 
originating from the point  
  iij jj μp,μp                                                                                                                                   (4)  
with slope equal to the marginal expenditure share i . 
 
Expenditure and price elasticities 
 
The expenditure share of commodity i is defined as: 
 
m
xpw iii                                                                                                                                         (5) 
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Then, the expenditure elasticity (Chung, 1994) reads: 
 
0
w
)m,x(E
i
i
i                                                                                                                             (6) 
 
which rules out the existence of inferior commodities. 
 
The own price elasticities1  can be shown to be equal to: 
 
)]μpm[αμp
]μpm[αμpα
w
)]m/)μp(1[α
)p,x(E
jj jiii
j jjiiii
i
ij
jji
ii 




                                                          (7) 
 
It follows from (7) that 0)p,x(E1 ii   so that the LES only allows for inelastic demand.  
 
Finally, the cross price elasticities (Chung, 1994) are: 
 
0
w
)m/p(
)p,x(E
i
jji
ji 
   for ji                                                                                            (8)                   
 
so that all commodities are gross complements. 
 
Indirect addilog system (IAS) 
 
The indirect addilog system has been introduced by Leser (1941) and, independently, by 
Somermeyer and Wit (1956) by directly specifying the functional form. Houthakker (1960) derived 
the system by applying Roy’s theorem to the indirect addilog utility function2:  
 





n
1i i
i
i
1)p/m(c)m,p(v
i
                                                                                                            (9) 
 
The expenditure share equations3 of IAS are: 
 




 n
1k
kk
ii
i
k
i
)p/m(c
)p/m(cw                                                                                                                     (10) 
 
In literature there is confusion about the restrictions to be imposed on the parameters4. Murty 
(1982), without proof, gives the correct restrictions: 
 
0ci   and 1i                                                                                                                          (11) 
 
for all i, the equality holding for at most n-1 items in the first case and at most for one commodity in 
the second case. The proof has been supplied by de Boer et al. (2006). 
The preference coefficients ic are indeterminate, that is to say: if we multiply each of them by the 
same factor, the equations (10) do not change. Therefore we impose the identifying restriction that 
the preference coefficients sum up to one: 
 



n
1i
i 1c                                                                                                                                         (12) 
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The Engel curve 
 
From (10) we derive: 
 
m
)p/m(c
)p/m(c
xp
k
i
k
n
1k
k
ii
ii 













                                                                                                        (13)                    
 
Since the first term in (13) is a non-linear function in m, the Engel curve is non-linear.                                          
 
It is shown in Somermeyer and Langhout (1972) that the Engel curve arises from the origin and 
that there are three main types: 
 
(i) unlimited monotonic increase if 1maxi  , where )(max jjmax   
 
(ii) monotonic increase to a maximum (saturation) level if 1maxi  , and 
 
(iii) decrease towards zero after having reached a maximum level if 1maxi   
 
It should be noted that types (ii) and (iii) can, in view of the parameter restriction (11) on i , not 
occur if 0max  .  
 
Expenditure and price elasticities 
 
It can easily be shown (Somermeyer and Langhout, 1972) that the expenditure elasticities are: 
 

 iii 1mln
xln)m,x(E   where   
j
jjw                                                                    (14) 
 
It follows from (14) that commodity i is necessary when i  and luxury when i . If 
1i  , then the commodity is inferior5. 
 
They called the parameters i  “reaction parameters”: the lower the value of iβ  (i.e. the closer it is 
to -1), the lower the expenditure elasticity and the more “urgent” the consumption of i may be 
considered to be.  
 
Somermeyer and Langhout (1972) give the own price elasticities: 
 
01)w1()p,x(E iiii                                                                                                         (15) 
 
so that Giffen goods are excluded.  
 
It follows from (15) that when  
 
0i                                                                                                                                              (16) 
 
1)p,x(E ii   so that elastic demand is allowed for by IAS. 
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The cross price elasticities are shown to be equal to: 
 
jjji w)p,x(E                         )ji(                                                                                             (17)                  
 
which means that all cross elasticities of a particular price jp are the same. In many low-income 
countries there is hardly any information on price responses so that such proportional effects seem 
to be the price to be paid for the scarcity of data. 
 
It follows from (17) that in case (15) holds true: 
 
0)p,x(E ji                                                                                                                                    (18) 
 
which means that  IAS allows for gross substitutes, as well. 
 
Calibration of parameters 
 
In the framework of a computable general equilibrium model (CGE), we first need to dispose of a 
Social Accounting matrix (SAM) pertaining to a particular year (for Palestine we dispose of the 
SAM of 1998). We put all prices equal to 1 and denote the household expenditure in the SAM 
by 0m , the demand for commodity i by 0ix , and the expenditure share by
0
iw . Second, we need to 
have an estimate of the expenditure elasticities )m,x(E i  (for Palestine we dispose of the 
expenditure survey of 1998 enabling us to estimate the expenditure elasticities, as we will see in 
section III below). For the identification of the parameters one additional value must be fixed. In the 
literature on CGE modeling one usually assigns a value to the so-called Frisch parameter m  
which is the expenditure elasticity of the marginal utility of expenditure.  
 
Fixing the Frisch parameter 
 
LES 
 
From (6) we derive the calibrated values of the marginal expenditure shares iα : 
 
)m,x(E.w i
0
ii                                                                                                                            (19)                    
 
where the superscript 0 denotes that it is the value of the expenditure share in the SAM. 
Note that for the calibration of iα we do not need to have a value of the Frisch parameter.  
However, it is needed for the calibration of the minimum quantities iμ . In case of the LES the 
Frisch parameter is shown to be equal to: 
 
)pm(
m     m.
m
j
jj
m  
                                                                                                   (20) 
(see Blonigen, et al., 1997). 
 
Since the subsistence expenditure jj jμp is at least equal to zero, it follows from (20) that the 
value of the Frisch parameter is restricted to: 1φm  . 
Putting prices equal to one, it follows from (3) and (20) that the calibrated values of iμ are given by: 
 
1
m
0
i
0
ii φmαxμ                                                                                                                           (21) 
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In case of LES the Frisch parameter (20) has a clear economic interpretation. It is minus the 
inverse of the fraction of supernumerary expenditure in total expenditure, so that a Frisch 
parameter of -1.20 means that 16.7% of the expenditure consists of subsistence expenditure and 
83.3% of supernumerary expenditure.  
 
IAS 
 
In order to calibrate the reaction parameters i  we need to have exactly the same information as 
for the LES: a SAM, estimates of all expenditure elasticities and an estimate of the Frisch 
parameter.  
 
The relationship between the indirect utility function and the marginal utility (see for instance 
equation (7.10) in Varian, 1992, page 108) is: 
m
)m,p(vλ 
 , so that it follows from (9) that for the 
indirect addilog system we have: 
 
jj β
j
1β
j
j pmcλ                                                                                                                            (22)                    
From (22) we derive: 2ββj
n
1j
jj
jj mpc)1β(
m
λ 

   . Consequently, it holds true that: 
1ββ
jj
n
1j
jm
jj mpc)1β(λ
1
m
λ
λ
mφ 


                                                                                              (23)                    
 
Changing the summation in (22) from j to k and substitution in (23), using the expressions for iw , 
i.e. (10), and for  , i.e. (14), results in: 
 
 














n
1j
jjn
1k
1ββ
kk
1ββ
jj
n
1j
jm 1β)1β(w
mpc
mpc
)1β(φ
kk
jj
                                                                (24)        
In view of (11) the value of the Frisch parameter6 is restricted to: 2φm  . When using calibration 
by means of the Frisch parameter, one should take account of this restriction.                                                     
 
It follows from (14) and (24) that the calibrated values of the reaction parameters i  are: 
 
mii φ)m,x(Eβ                                                                                                                           (25)                    
 
In appendix A we prove: 
 



n
1j
β00
j
β00
ii
ji ]m[x/]m[xc ,                                                                                                         (26) 
the superscript 0 denoting again the value of the pertinent variable in the SAM. 
After substitution of (25) in (26) the calibrated values of the preference parameters ic read: 
 



n
1j
)m,x(E00
j
)m,x(E00
ii
ji ]m[x/]m[xc                                                                                              (27) 
                                                                                                               
Note that for the calibration of ic we do not need to have a value of the Frisch parameter. 
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Fixing one own price elasticity 
 
In case of IAS the Frisch parameter m (cf. (24)) does not have a clear economic interpretation.  
We feel that a value of the own price elasticity of food of, say, -0.8 has a clearer economic 
interpretation than a value of, say, -1.20 for the Frisch parameter 1βφm  . Therefore, we 
propose to fix the own price elasticity of the reference commodity 1 as alternative.   
 
LES 
 
Putting prices equal to one, adding a superscript 0 to denote the value in the SAM, we derive from 
(3) that for commodity 1 it holds true that: 
 
11
n
2j
j1
0
1 )1()m(x  

                                                                                                      (28) 
 
Putting prices equal to one, we derive from (7) that for commodity 1 it holds true that: 
 
)p,x(Ex)m( 11
0
1
n
2j
j1  

                                                                                                         (29) 
 
Substitution of (29) into (28) and solving for 1 yields: 
  
 1
0
i11
1 α1
x)p,x(E1μ 
                                                                                                                      (30) 
 
From (21) we derive for commodity 1: 
 
1
1
0
11
m
0
α
)μx(φm                                                                                                                         (31) 
Substitution of (31) in (21) yields for n,...,2i  : 
 
 101
1
i0
ii μxα
αxμ                              for n,...,2i                                                                      (32) 
 
IAS 
 
From (15) we derive for 1β : 
 
)w1/()]p,E(x 1[ 01111                                                                                                           (33) 
 
Equation (25) yields for n,...,2i  : 
 
)]m,x(E)m,x(E[ 1i1i               for n,...,2i                                                                       (34) 
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III. EXPENDITURE SURVEY DATA: ESTIMATION AND TESTING 
 
ESTIMATING LES  
 
In an expenditure survey, pertaining to a certain year, prices are not recorded, so that it is 
assumed that all households face the same price. Without loss of generality all prices are put equal 
to one. Introducing the index t, to denote the respondent, (t=1,…T, T being the number of 
respondents), and an additive disturbance ( )ti , the LES (3) boils down to: 
 
titiiti
j
jtiiti m)m(x                                                                               (35) 
 
where 
j
jiii μαμγ  
 
Defining: 
 











Ti
i1
i
x
.
.
.
x
y ;











T
1
m1
..
..
..
m1
X ; 


i
i
i α
γπ  and  













Ti
i1
i
.
.
.
                                                                    (36)    
 
we can rewrite (35) to: 
 
iii επXy       n,...,1i                                                                                                                (37)                    
 
i.c. to a seemingly unrelated regression model (SUR) with identical explanatory variables for which 
it is known that ordinary least squares applied to each equation separately is efficient (Heij et al., 
2004, p. 687). If the disturbances are normally distributed, the maximum likelihood estimator is 
equivalent to this procedure. We need the assumption of normality when testing LES against IAS 
(see below). 
 
ESTIMATING IAS 
 
Somermeyer and Wit (1956) proposed to select a reference commodity that, without loss of 
generality, is commodity 1. Putting prices equal to one, using the index t to denote the respondent 
and introducing an additive disturbance, it easily follows from (10), that: 
 
tit1ii1tti
1t
ti εmlog)ββ(δxlogxlog)
x
xlog(    n,...,2i                                                    (38) 
 
with 1ii clogclog  .                                                                                                                  (39) 
 
Defining: 
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we can rewrite (38) to: 
 
iii επ~X~y~       n,...,2i                                                                                                               (41)                  
 
which is a seemingly unrelated regression model (SUR) with identical explanatory variables again, 
so that ordinary least squares applied to each equation separately is efficient, and equivalent to ML 
estimation in case of normally distributed disturbances, as well. 
Having obtained the differences of the parameters of interest, we obtain the estimates of the 
expenditure elasticities by rewriting (14) to: 
 
  
j j
1ij1ijjiii )(w)(1w11)m,x(E                                            (42)     
 
Testing LES versus IAS 
 
For two reasons it is not possible to test LES against IAS by the usual likelihood ratio test. First, the 
variable to be explained in the LES model is the expenditure on commodity n,...,1i  ( iy , see 
(36)), whereas in the IAS model it is the log-change in expenditure (i.e. the logarithm of the 
expenditure on commodity n,...2i  in deviation from the logarithm of the demand of the reference 
commodity 1, iy~ , see (40)). De Boer and Paap (2009) solve this problem by transforming the 
density function of IAS in terms of the log-change in expenditure to the density in terms of 
expenditure. The second problem is that the models are non-nested. De Boer and Paap (2009) 
apply the likelihood ratio test of Vuong (1989) for non-nested models and the distribution-free non-
nested model test of Clarke (2007) to the problem at hand. For both tests the null hypothesis is that 
IAS and LES are equally close to the true model, the (one-sided) alternative being that IAS is 
closer to the true model than LES. Besides the test statistics and their distribution (for Vuong 
standard normal and Clarke binomial with number of trials equal to the number of respondents T 
and a probability of success of 5.0p  ), they give the Gauss 6.0 code for the estimation of LES 
and IAS, and for the testing of LES versus IAS by means of Vuong (1989) and Clarke (2007). 
 
IV. APLICATION TO PECS 1998 
      
The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (1998) conducted the Palestinian Expenditure and 
Consumption Survey (PECS, 1998). We aggregate the 29 groups of expenditure into 3 groups: the 
“Agrifood” sector, which contains agriculture and food processing industry (including beverages 
and tobacco), “Manufacturing” and “Services”. For IAS we choose as reference commodity 
“Agrifood”, which is non-zero for all 2,851 households that participated in the survey. Eight 
respondents reported zero expenditure for “Manufacturing” and six (other) respondents reported 
zero expenditure for “Services”; we replace them by 1 Jordanian dinar.  
We estimate the parameters of LES and IAS according to (37) and (41). The average log-likelihood 
contribution of LES turns out to be −12.128, while for IAS we obtain −10.948 (in levels). The values 
of the log-likelihood functions of both models suggest that IAS is better than LES. To analyze 
whether this difference is statistically significant, we consider the Vuong and Clarke tests 
discussed in section III. The value of the Vuong test statistic equals 6.6079 and hence we reject 
the null that both specifications are equally close to the true specification versus the alternative that 
IAS is closer (using EViews we find a P-value of 1.95e-011). When we apply the Clarke test, we 
 12
find that in 82.1% of the cases the log-likelihood contribution of the IAS specification is larger than 
the log-likelihood contribution of the LES specification (using EViews we find that the P-value 
based on a binomial distribution with number of trials T =2,851 and p=0.5 is 0). Hence, the Clarke 
test also indicates that IAS is significantly closer to the true specification than LES. 
According to both tests there is overwhelming evidence that the IAS indirect utility function is likely 
to be (much) closer to the “true” indirect utility function than LES. The first consequence is that the 
money metric indirect utility function (Varian, 1992, p. 110) used for the evaluation of policy 
changes in the form of equivalent and/or compensating variation (Varian, 1992, p.161), is likely to 
be (much) better estimated for by IAS than by LES. The second consequence is that the estimated 
expenditure elasticities by means of IAS are likely to be (much) closer to the “true” expenditure 
elasticities than the ones estimated by LES. Therefore, in the sequel, we shall use the IAS 
elasticities. 
In Table 1 we provide the parameter estimates and the estimated expenditure elasticities of IAS. 
The latter are based on the total expenditure shares of the commodities in the SAM 1998 (the 
representative household in the CGE model of section V below). 
 
Table 1 Expenditure elasticities* for Palestine, 1998 
 
* The elasticities are computed using Equation (42), where iw  is set equal to the total expenditure 
share of commodity i in the SAM 1998. 
 
It follows that the expenditure elasticity of “Agrifood” is lower than one, which means that it is a 
necessary commodity, confirming the famous law of Engel (1857). The other two groups turn out to 
be luxury commodities, since their expenditure elasticity is larger than one. The estimated values 
are positive, so that none of the commodities is inferior, which makes sense in a situation where 
one distinguishes but three main commodity groups. 
 
Calibration of parameters: fixing the Frisch parameter 
 
Following Missaglia and de Boer (2004) we calibrate the parameters using the approach of fixing 
the Frisch parameter. In the CGE model for Palestine (see section V below) the selected value was 
-1.20, corresponding to a subsistence expenditure of 16.7% of total expenditure. It turned out that 
the model had a (very) good ex-post evaluation of macro-economic indicators (De Boer, 2009) so 
that we adopt that value as well. In Table 2 we report on the results7. 
 
Table 2. Calibrated values of the parameters* 
 IAS LES 
 
iβ  ic  iα  iμ  
1 Agrifood -0.3393 0.8031 0.3258 445.11
2 Manufacturing -0.1250 0.0897 0.2716 107.19
3 Services -0.1017 0.1072 0.4026 126.53
Sum  1.0000 1.0000 678.83
* Based on the expenditure elasticities reported in Table 1  
   and a Frisch parameter of -1.20  
 
The sum of the preference coefficients of IAS ( ic ) is equal to one, as it should be. For the LES 
function the sum of the marginal expenditure shares ( iα ) is equal to one and the minimum 
quantities demanded are all positive, as it should be. A household with expenditure below this 
Expenditure  
group i 
Expenditure 
(million US$) 
Expenditure
share iw   
1i  Standard
error 
Expenditure  
elasticity 
Standard
Error 
Agrifood 1,551 0.381   0.861 0.008 
Manufacturing 1,029 0.253 0.214 0.020 1.075 0.020 
Services 1,493 0.366 0.238 0.023 1.098 0.023 
Total expenditure 4,073      
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value has, according to LES, a utility level of zero. The sum of the minimum quantities demanded 
( iμ ) represents the subsistence expenditure which, in the framework of the LES, is used as the 
poverty line (Lluch, et al., 1977; De Vos, 1991). In Table 3 we give the percentage of the (2,851) 
households that had an expenditure below the minimum quantities demanded and below the 
subsistence expenditure. 
 
Table 3 Percentage of households in PECS 1998 below 
             minimum quantities and below poverty line 
 Minimum quantities 
demanded ( iμ ) (US$) 
and poverty line  i iμ
        
Percentage of  
households  
below minimum 
quantity or below 
poverty line 
Agrifood 445.11 80.6 
Manufacturing 107.18 30.5 
Services 126.53 22.9 
Subsistence  
Expenditure 
678.82 47.9 
 
It follows that 80.6% of the households have a utility level of zero and that 47.9% of the households 
are below the poverty line8 based on LES. According to IAS each of these households has a 
positive utility level. Consequently, in micro simulation models where the results of a macro CGE 
model (with one representative household) are used at micro level, IAS has a clear advantage over 
LES because it assigns positive utility levels to all households (provided that zero expenditure on a 
commodity is replaced by a small positive number).    
 
Engel curves 
 
The maximum of the reaction parameters of IAS ( iβ ) is smaller than zero (cf. Table 1) which 
means that the Engel curves of all three commodities are of type (i): arising from the origin with an 
unlimited monotonic increase. The Engel curves of LES are straight lines originating from 
( j ij μ;μ ), i.c. (4) with prices put equal to one, and with slope equal to the marginal expenditure 
share iα . To give an example: the Engel curve for Agrifood starts in the point (678.82; 445.11) 
(see Table 3) with slope 0.3258 (see Table 2). This Engel curve intersects the Engel curve of IAS 
in the equilibrium point (4,073; 1,551) (see Table 1). In Table 5 we give the estimated values of 
expenditure on the commodities according to both Engel curves for a number of values of 
expenditure (m). 
 
Table 4  Total expenditure and expenditure on commodities (US$)  
Total 
Expenditure 
Expenditure  
on Agrifood 
Expenditure on
Manufacturing 
Expenditure 
on Services 
m LES IAS LES IAS LES IAS 
3,000 1,201 1,192 738 741 1,061 1,067
3,500 1,364 1,361 873 874 1,262 1,264
4,073 1,551 1,551 1,029 1,029 1,493 1,493
4,500 1,690 1,690 1,145 1,145 1,665 1,665
5,000 1,853 1,849 1,281 1,282 1,866 1,869
 
As expected, LES being a linear approximation of IAS around the equilibrium point, the values are 
very close to each other. As a consequence, it is to be expected that in simulations the real part of 
the CGE model will not produce a lot of differences between both specifications.  
In table 5, finally, we give the implied price elasticities. 
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Table 5 Price elasticities 
 Price elasticities LES Price elasticities IAS 
Commodity 1 2 3 1 2 3 
1 -0.807 -0.023 -0.027 -0.790 -0.032 -0.037
2 -0.117 -0.924 -0.033 -0.129 -0.907 -0.037
3 -0.120 -0.029 -0.949 -0.129 -0.032 -0.935
 
It turns out that the implied own and cross price elasticities which are based on the expenditure 
elasticities according to IAS and and a Frisch parameter of -1.20, are close to each other. The 
implied own price elasticity of the reference commodity (Agrifood) is equal to about -0.8. 
 
Calibration of parameters: fixing one own price elasticity 
 
First, we increase value of the own price elasticity of Agrifood, )p,x(E 11 , from about -0.80 to -0.72 
(10%). Then, for IAS, according to (33) the value of 1  decreases and by virtue of (34), the values 
of i  ( )n,...,2i  decrease as well. As a consequence, the value of the Frisch parameter (24) 
decreases (recall that the preference coefficients ic are identified). For LES the minimum quantity 
of commodity 1, 1 , increases by virtue of (30) and by (32) so do i  ( )n,...,2i  . As a 
consequence, the subsistence expenditure increases, so that the Frisch parameter decreases, see 
(20) (recall that the marginal expenditure shares i are identified). In the columns 2-4 of Table 6 we 
summarize our findings. 
 
Table 6 Calibrated values* 
 Own price elasticity  
72.0)p,x(E 11   
Own price elasticity  
88.0)p,x(E 11   
 IAS 
iβ  
LES 
iμ  
 
Percentage 
below iμ  
or i iμ  
IAS 
iβ  
LES 
iμ  
 
Agrifood -0.4522 644.16 93.8 -0.1938 276.07 
Manufacturing -0.2378 273.10 75.8  0.0206 -33.72 
Services -0.2145 372.48 74.5  0.0439 -92.35 
Subsistence  
expenditure 
 1,289.74 85.4   
Frisch  
parameter 
-1.31 -1.46  -1.05 -1.04 
* Based on the expenditure elasticities reported in Table 1.  
 
It turns out that the Frisch parameter according to IAS decreases by about 10% from -1.20 to  
-1.31, whereas the Frisch parameter according to LES decreases by about 20% to -1.46 
(corresponding to a subsistence expenditure of about 30% of total expenditure). The percentage of 
respondents with utility zero according to LES increases to 93.8%, whereas the percentage of 
households below the subsistence level increases to 85.4%, which is quite unrealistic.    
Second, we decrease the value of the own price elasticity of Agrifood by 10% to -0.88. The results 
are reported in the columns 5 and 6 of Table 6. For IAS the reaction parameters for Manufacturing 
and Services become positive, whereas for LES the minimum quantities demanded become 
negative. Consequently, in this example LES cannot handle an own price elasticity of Agrifood of -
0.88, whereas IAS can.  
In Table 7 we give the price elasticities for the two scenarios.  
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Table 7 Price elasticities 
 LES 72.0)p,x(E 11   IAS 72.0)p,x(E 11   IAS 88.0)p,x(E 11   
Commodity 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
1 Agrifood -0.720 -0.057 -0.078 -0.720 -0.047 -0.062 -0.880  0.004  0.013 
2 Manufact. -0.170 -0.807 -0.098 -0.135 -0.822 -0.062 -0.579 -1.015  0.013 
3 Services -0.174 -0.074 -0.851 -0.135 -0.047 -0.864 -0.579  0.004 -1.028 
 
As before, the price elasticities between LES and IAS do not differ much in case of an own price 
elasticity of Agrifood of -0.72. Since LES is not applicable for an own price elasticity of  
-0.88, we only give them for IAS. The reaction parameters of Manufacturing and of Services are 
positive so that the demand for these commodities is elastic (absolute value of own price elasticity 
larger than one, see (16)) and commodities 2 and 3 are gross substitutes for Agrifood (cross price 
elasticities positive, cf. (18)).     
 
V. APPLICATION TO THE CGE MODEL FOR PALESTINE 
 
In this section we show a concrete Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) application of the 
addilog demand system. The application is related to previous work on the Palestinian economy 
(Missaglia and de Boer, 2004; De Boer and Missaglia, 2006, De Boer, 2009) and refers to the 
building of a counterfactual Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) for the Palestinian economy in 2002. 
The last available official SAM for the Palestinian economy dates back to 1998 and the need to 
build a new, counterfactual SAM comes from the tremendous shock suffered by the Palestinian 
economy after the outbreak (29 September 2000) of the second intifada (“uprising”), which is likely 
to have dramatically changed its size and composition. Before illustrating our results we give a 
short description of both the CGE model and the intifada-shock. 
 
Model 
 
We have seven economic agents: three firms, one household, a bank that allocates savings over 
investments, the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the rest of the world (RoW). In their appendix 2 
Missaglia and de Boer (2004) present the glossary of symbols and in their appendix 3 the 
equations of the model. 
 
The three firms combine intermediate inputs into the intermediates by means of a Leontief 
technology, whereas capital and labor are combined into value added by means of constant 
elasticities of substitution (CES) technology. Using the Leontief assumption, both aggregates are 
combined into the supply of the domestically produced commodity. This commodity is transformed 
via constant elasticities of transformation (CET) function into an export commodity and into a 
domestic commodity supplied to the domestic market. This commodity is combined with imports to 
produce the composite commodity. To that end we adopt the Armington assumption by using a 
CES functional form. This commodity is either used in the production process (intermediate 
demand) or for final purposes: consumption, consumption of the Palestinian authority (PA), and 
investment. 
 
The household owns the capital, receives transfers from the PA and from the RoW, and it disposes 
of a time endowment. The household is assumed to have preferences according to IAS (or LES) 
augmented for leisure9. We use the unemployment theory delineated in the migration literature by 
Harris and Todaro (1970) to describe the wage gap between rural and urban jobs. In our 
framework, the wage rate paid by Palestinian firms to Palestinian workers must be equal, in 
equilibrium, to the expected wage rate of the Palestinian workers employed in Israel or in the 
settlements (for a more detailed description we refer to Missaglia and de Boer, 2004). All sources 
of income (capital, transfers and wages earned in Israel and Palestine) together yield the 
household expenditure. The household pays income taxes and saves a fixed fraction out of its 
income after taxes. Subtracting taxes and savings from income yields the expenditure that it 
devotes to the purchase of commodities. 
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The PA derives its revenues from two sources: taxes (on imports, capital, labor, consumption 
commodities and on the income of the household) and foreign aid. These revenues are spent on 
transfers, savings and on other expenditures. With respect to the latter we assume that the PA 
maximizes a Cobb-Douglas utility function. 
 
The bank allocates the household savings, the PA savings and the foreign savings over the 
investment demand for the commodities. To that end the bank is assumed to maximize a Cobb-
Douglas utility function subject to the constraint that savings are equal to total investments.  
 
For the Palestinian economy, the RoW basically coincides with Israel. Palestine earns revenues 
from the RoW via exports and other sources: foreign aid accruing to the PA, remittances from the 
workers employed in Israel or in the settlements, foreign transfers directly accruing to the 
households and foreign savings, i.e. the deficit in the current account balance. These revenues are 
spent on imports of goods. Imports and exports are treated in a rather standard way, through, 
respectively, an Armington-CES and a CET assumption. 
 
Shock 
 
It is useful, for the sake of our argument, to compare the outcomes of the same shock given to an 
IAS-version of the model and a LES-version of the same model (Missaglia and de Boer, 2004). 
Since the focus of this paper is on methodological issues, giving the model a “realistic” shock is not 
strictly required. Yet, it makes sense trying to understand what happens when a sort of shock hits 
the economy. Such a shock is rather complex and we consider here a simplified version10 
compared to that fully described in Missaglia and de Boer (2004). In particular, we study the effects 
prompted by a 25% reduction in the capital stock and a 50% reduction in the Palestinian labor 
force employed in Israel and its settlements.  
 
Results (fixing the Frisch parameter at -1.20) 
 
In Table 8 we give the results for real consumption, exclusive of indirect taxes, and of real GDP.  
 
Table 8 Real consumption* and real GDP before and after the shock 
 
 Benchmark 
SAM 1998 
(millions US$) 
LES 
2002 
(millions US$,
prices 1998) 
Change
(%) 
IAS 
2002 
(millions US$,
prices 1998) 
Change 
(%) 
Agrifood 1,519 1,326 -12.7 1,334 -12.2 
Manufacturing   942    799 -15.2    797 -15.4 
Services 1,441 1,220 -15.3 1,219 -15.4 
Consumption 3,902 3,345 -14.3 3,350 -14.1 
GDP 4,229 3,494 -17.4 3,506 -17.1 
* Exclusive of indirect taxes.  
 
As expected, the results of the real part of the model do not differ much between the LES and the 
IAS-version. 
 
In table 9 we give the results for the price indexes and the equivalent variation (in prices 1998). 
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Table 9 Price indexes* (1998 = 100) 
 and equivalent variation (prices 1998) 
              LES IAS 
Agrifood 113.0 114.4 
Manufacturing 112.2 113.5 
Services 111.9 113.0 
Laspeyres price index 
(1998 =100) 
112.4 114.0 
Equivalent variation 
(prices 1998) 
-489.3 -538.5
*Net of indirect taxes 
 
The price index for the IAS version of the model is 1.4 percentage points higher for Agrifood, 1.3 
percentage points for Manufacturing and 2.1 percentage points for Services than in the LES 
version. The Laspeyres consumer price index (CPI) is 1.6 percentage points higher according to 
the IAS version than for LES. Consequently, the price responses are substantially higher for IAS 
than for LES. The real equivalent variation (in absolute terms) is 10% higher for IAS than for LES. 
In nominal terms they amount to – 614 for IAS and – 550 for LES, or 11.6% higher for IAS than for 
LES. Consequently, in a LES framework the welfare losses are likely to be grossly underestimated 
since there was overwhelming evidence that the indirect utility function of IAS is (much) closer to 
the true indirect utility function than the one by LES.   
 
Results (fixing the own price elasticity of Agrifood at -0.72) 
 
Table 10 Real consumption*, real GDP, price indexes and  
real equivalent variation before and after the shock 
 
 LES 
2002 
(millions US$, 
prices 1998) 
IAS 
2002 
(millions US$,
prices 1998) 
LES 
Price 
indexes 
(1998=100) 
and EV 
(prices 1998)
IAS 
Price 
Indexes 
(1998=100) 
and EV 
(prices 1998) 
Agrifood 1,328 1,338 113.4 115.5 
Manufacturing    799    797 112.5 114.5 
Services 1,220 1,221 112.2 113.7 
Consumption 3,347 3,356 112.7 114.6 
GDP 3,498 3,516   
Equivalent 
Variation 
       -491.4      -545.6 
* Exclusive of indirect taxes.  
 
Compared to Table 9, the Laspeyres CPI according to the LES version of the model increases by 
0.3 percentage points, whereas it increases by 0.6 percentage points according to IAS. When the 
own price elasticity is increased to -0.72, the price response, measured by the Laspeyres CPI, is 2 
percentage points higher for IAS as compared to LES. The real equivalent variation (in absolute 
terms) is 11% higher for IAS, in nominal amounts they amount to -625 for IAS and -554 for LES, or 
12.8% higher for IAS than for LES.  
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this paper we try to give an answer to the question whether in a Computable General 
Equilibrium model (CGE) household preferences should be modeled according to the Linear 
Expenditure System (LES) or to the Indirect Addilog System (IAS). Both models describe 
household preferences by means of 2n parameters, where n denotes the number of commodities 
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distinguished in the household’s expenditure. The parameters of both models are uniquely 
identified (“calibrated”) when one disposes of a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM), a value for the 
expenditure elasticities and a value for the Frisch parameter (or, alternatively, one price elasticity). 
In case one disposes of an expenditure survey, as well, the expenditure elasticities of both models 
can easily be estimated by means of application of ordinary least squares to linear equations 
separately. Consequently, both models are as easy to implement but IAS has the following 
advantages over LES. 
 
1. Its Engel curves arise from the origin and are non-linear, whereas in LES the Engel curves are 
straight lines departing from a point of which the coordinates are positive. IAS allows for the 
existence of inferior commodities, elastic demand and gross substitution, whereas LES does not 
(recall the example where the own price elasticity of Agrifood is fixed at -0.88: the two other 
commodities exhibit elastic demand and are gross substitutes for Agrifood; whereas LES cannot 
be used). Consequently, IAS provides for a theoretically richer description of household behavior 
than LES. 
 
2. In case one disposes of an expenditure survey, LES can be tested against IAS. In the case of 
the three commodities example (PECS, 1998 with 2,851 households) we already found 
overwhelming statistical evidence that IAS is (much) closer to the true system than LES. Vuong’s 
parametric test statistic yields a value of 6.608, whereas the (one-sided) critical value at a level of 
significance of 5% is the well-known 1.645; applying Clarke’s non-parametric test, we find that in 
82% of the cases the log-likelihood contribution of the IAS specification is larger than the log-
likelihood contribution of the LES specification. When one distinguishes more commodities, the 
statistical evidence of IAS being superior to LES becomes even stronger. De Boer and Paap 
(2009) who applied both tests to a ten commodities example (PECS, 2005 with 2,152  households) 
report a value of 31.033 for the Vuong statistic and a percentage of 91% of a higher log-likelihood 
contribution by IAS in case of Clarke’s test.  
 
Consequently, we find overwhelming evidence that the IAS indirect utility function is likely to be 
(much) closer to the “true” indirect utility function than LES. The expenditure elasticities estimated 
for by IAS are likely to be (much) closer to the true elasticities than the ones estimated using LES. 
 
3. The money metric indirect utility function (Varian, 1992, p. 110) used for the evaluation of policy 
changes in the form of equivalent and/or compensating variation is likely to be (much) better 
estimated for by IAS than by LES. In the example of our CGE model for Palestine in case we use a 
Frisch parameter of  -1.20 for the calibration of the parameters (implying an own price elasticity for 
Agrifood of -0.80) we find that the real equivalent variation (in absolute terms) is 10% higher for 
IAS than for LES; the nominal equivalent variation being 11.6% higher for IAS than for LES. In 
case we use an own elasticity of -0.72 for calibration, these percentages increase to 11% for the 
real equivalent variation and to 12.8% for the nominal one.  
 
Consequently, in a LES framework the welfare changes are likely to be grossly underestimated.  
 
4. In the framework of a LES, households with expenditure below one (or more) of the minimum 
quantities demanded are assigned a utility level of zero, whereas in IAS they are assigned a 
positive utility (provided that zero expenditure on a commodity is replaced by a small positive 
number). In our example we find that in the case of a Frisch parameter of -1.20, the percentage of 
households with utility zero equals 80.6%; in the case of an own price elasticity of Agrifood of -0.72 
this percentage increases to 93.8%. 
 
Consequently, in micro simulation models where the results of a macro CGE model (with one 
representative household) are used at micro level, IAS has a clear advantage over LES of 
assigning a positive utility to all households, whereas LES does not. 
 
Last, but not least, we hope to have convinced practitioners of CGE models that the answer to the 
question in the title is: use IAS! 
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APPENDIX A DERIVATION OF EQUATION (26) 
 
Putting prices equal to one we derive from (10): 
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Summation over n,...,2k  and using (12) leads to: 
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Substitution in (A1) gives: 
 




 n
1k
k
i
i
k
i
mx
mxc        n,...,2i                                                                                                      (A3) 
 
Combination of (A2) and (A3) yields: 
 




 n
1k
k
i
i
k
i
mx
mxc        n,...,1i                                                                                                         (A4) 
 
Adding the superscript 0 (denoting the value in the SAM) to ix and m we obtain equation (26). 
 
APPENDIX B THE INDIRECT ADDILOG SYSTEM WITH LEISURE 
 
Model and calibration 
 
We assume that the household has an exogenously given time endowment, denoted by TS, that it 
allocates over labor supply, denoted by LS, and leisure, denoted by 1nx  , i.e. 
 
1nxLSTS                                                                                                                                (B1) 
 
We take account of the consumption of leisure, valued at the wage rate 1np  , define the extended 
household expenditure: 
 
1n1n xpmem                                                                                                                           (B2) 
 
and assume that the household maximizes the extended indirect addilog utility function: 
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




1n
1j j
j
j
1)p/em(
c)em,p(v
j
                                                                                                     (B3) 
 
subject to the extended household expenditure (B2).  
It follows straightforwardly that the optimal shares in extended expenditure are: 
 




 1n
1k
kk
ii
i
k
i
)p/em(c
)p/em(cw                            1n,...,1i                                                                      (B4) 
 
As before, we need to have outside information on the expenditure elasticities and on the Frisch 
parameter (or on one own price elasticity) in order to calibrate the parameters iβ  and ic (i running 
from 1 to n for the commodities, while i is equal to 1n   for leisure). In this framework we need to 
have values of these elasticities (and of the Frisch parameter) with respect to extended household 
expenditure, em (including leisure), but in practice they are usually supplied with respect to 
expenditure, m (excluding leisure). Moreover, in practice a value of the elasticity of labor supply 
with respect to expenditure m is specified, rather than the expenditure elasticity of leisure with 
respect to extended expenditure. 
 
First, we consider the case that i runs from 1 to n. Because (B2) implies that: 
 
 1
)m(d
)em(d                                                                                                                                       (B5) 
 
 it follows that: 
 
m
em).m,x(E)em,x(E ii                                                                                                                 (B6) 
 
Second, we consider leisure ( 1nx  ). Using (B1) we derive: 
 
LS
x.
x
m.
m
x)m,LS(E 1n
1n
1n 



 .  
 
Using the same reasoning as with (B6) and replacing 1nx   by ( LSTS  ) according to (B1), we 
arrive at: 
 
m
em.
)LSTS(
LS).m,LS(E)em,x(E 1n                                                                                        (B7) 
 
For the Frisch parameter with respect to extended expenditure, using (B5), we derive: 
 
m
em.φ
em
λ.λ
emφ mem 
                                                                                                               (B8) 
 
Similarly to (25) we calibrate the parameters i : 
 
emii )em,x(E                                1n,...,1i                                                                     (B9)                    
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The parameters ic  are calibrated in the same way as in (27): 
 



1n
1j
)em,x(E00
j
)em,x(E00
ii
ji ]em[x/]em[xc            1n,...,1i                                                         (B10)                    
 
Equivalent and compensating variation 
 
Suppose that we have two different policy regimes: the "benchmark equilibrium", and the 
"proposed change". Under the "benchmark equilibrium" the household faces prices and (extended) 
expenditure ( )em,p 00 , and under the "proposed change" it faces )em,p( 11 .  
The equivalent variation (EV) measures the expenditure change at current prices ( 0p ) that would 
be equivalent to the proposed change in terms of its impact on utility. Let evem denote the 
expenditure that at current prices ( 0p ) would yield utility level )em,p(V 11 , i.e.: 
 
)em,p(V)em,p(V 11ev0                                                                                                               (B11) 
 
Consequently, the equivalent variation is defined as: 
 
0ev ememEV                                                                                                                          (B12) 
 
It follows from the indirect utility function (B3) that vem has to be solved numerically from: 
 
0
])p/em()p/em[(c1n
1j j
0
j
ev1
j
1
j
jj




                                                                                           (B13) 
 
The compensating variation (CV) measures the expenditure change that would be necessary to 
compensate the household for the price change induced by the "proposed change". 
Let cvem denote the expenditure that at prices 1p  would yield the utility level )em,p(V 00 , i.e.:  
 
)em,p(V)em,p(V 00cv1                                                                                                              (B14) 
 
Consequently, the compensating variation is equal to: 
 
cv1 ememCV                                                                                                                          (B15) 
 
where cvem  has to be solved numerically from: 
 
0
])p/em()p/em[(c1n
1j j
0
j
01
j
cv
j
jj




                                                                                           (B16) 
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1 The own price elasticity given by Chung (1994) is not correct; the correct one is given in (7). 
2 The specification of Houthakker reads: i)p/m(c i
*
i
 .  Using the reparametrization i*ii cc   and 
subtracting the constant   ii /c we arrive at (9). Both specifications represent the same preferences, but 
the advantage of (9) is that the parameter restrictions can readily be derived, see Murty (1982) and de Boer 
et al. (2006), and that the special case 0i  is defined to be equal to ).p/mln( i  
3 In Leser (1941), Somermeyer and Wit (1956) and Somermeyer and Langhout (1972) the reaction 
coefficients are denoted by i  (= i ). If all  j IAS reduces to the constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) function (Arrow et al., 1961); the elasticity of substitution being )β1(σ  . If, moreover, 0 , we 
obtain the Cobb-Douglas function (Cobb and Douglas, 1928).  
4 Hanoch (1975), Deaton and Muelbauer (1980) and Chung (1994) give as restriction 0βi  , excluding the 
region 0β1 i   . As a consequence, the existence of inelastic demand and of gross complementarity is, 
erroneously, excluded. 
5 Consider for instance the case of two commodities which have a budget share of 0.5 each, while 
2.01   and 22  . Then, commodity 1 is inferior. 
6 For the Cobb-Douglas utility function we have 1m  and for the CES utility function (see footnote 3): 
 )1(m . 
7 We calibrate the marginal budget shares i of LES by means of (19), because we use the income 
elasticities estimated for by IAS. If only LES is used, the marginal budget shares are estimated by applying 
OLS to (36). We calibrate the preference coefficients ic  by means of (27). Alternatively, we might have used 
the estimated values of i obtained applying OLS to (41), denoted by iˆ ( n,...,2i  ). From (39), using the 
identifying restriction (12), it can easily be derived that ])ˆexp(1/[1cˆ
n
2i
11 

   and )ˆexp(cˆcˆ i1i   for 
n,...2i  . 
8 Using a poverty level of 2.1 US$ per day, the World Bank (2003) estimates the percentage of poor in 1998 
at 23.2%. 
9 In their Appendix 7.1 Blonigen et al.(1997) give the relevant formulae for LES. In Appendix B we derive the 
relevant formulae for IAS. For the calibration of the parameters we used the income elasticities given in 
Table 1, a value of -1.20 for the Frisch parameter, and a value of -0.50 for the income elasticity of labor 
supply. 
10 The decline in real GDP according to the simplified version is 17.1%, see Table 6. The decline according 
to the full shock is 20.5% (De Boer and Missaglia, 2006). 
